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In this paper we test the hypothesis that credit policies are pro-cyclical. Our 
approach is based on a stochastic frontier analysis of borrower data, as in Chen 
and Wang (2008). We extend the applicability of the approach, and propose a 
novel test specification which is informative of many types of pro-cyclicality. 
  The analysis of representative samples of household borrowers during a huge 
cycle and its aftermath yields evidence of time-varying credit policy. We find that 
the focus of credit policy changed from collateral to current income during the 
cycle. Instead of a credit crunch, ie, an overall tightening of credit during the 
economic and financial contraction, we find a tightening of credit limits with 
respect to a minority of borrowers and an easing for the majority. 
  In the course of the post-crisis period, credit policy became more lenient. 
Both the level of credit limits and the ‘tailoring’ of limits to group-specific 
characteristics of households increased. A reduction in the idiosyncratic variance 
of limits suggest that banks have become more consistent in their credit policies. 
 
Keywords: credit policy, credit constraints, household borrowing, frontier 
analysis. 
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Luottolama? Havaintoja lainapolitiikan syklisyydestä 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 10/2009 
Risto Herrala 




Tutkimuksessa testataan hypoteesia, jonka mukaan pankkien lainapolitiikka on 
myötäsyklistä eli löysää noususuhdanteessa ja kireää laskusuhdanteessa. Lä-
hestymistapana on stokastinen rintama-analyysi, kuten Chenin ja Wangin (2008) 
tutkimuksessa. Lähestymistavan soveltuvuusaluetta laajennetaan ja testi muotoil-
laan uudelleen siten, että se kykenee erottelemaan monentyyppistä myötä-
syklisyyttä. 
  Testisykli on Suomen 1990-luvun pankkikriisisykli ja sen jälkeinen aika, ja se 
on arvioitu yhdeksi kaikkein voimakkaimmista sykleistä kansainvälisissä 
pankkikriisejä koskevissa vertailuissa. Kotitalouslainanottajien edustavien otosten 
vertailu paljastaa vaihteluja lainapolitiikassa testisyklin aikana. 
  Testitulokset eivät viittaa siihen, että pankit olisivat yleisesti tiukentaneen 
lainapolitiikkaansa lainamarkkinoiden laman aikana. Sen sijaan havaitaan, että 
lainapolitiikka oli kotitalouksien lainanottajista aiempaa tiukempaa vähemmistöllä 
ja aiempaa löysempää enemmistöllä. Kriisin jälkeen pankkien lainapolitiikka on 
selvästi löystynyt kotitalousasiakkailla. 
 
Avainsanat: lainapolitiikka, lainarajoitteet, kotitalouksien lainanotto, rintama-
analyysi 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D14, E32, E51, G21  
5 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 3 
Tiivistelmä (abstract in Finnish) .............................................................................. 4 
 
1 Introduction  ......................................................................................................  7 
 
2 Methodology  .....................................................................................................  8 
 
3  Estimation results from a simple model ....................................................... 11 
 
4  Estimation results of an extended model ..................................................... 16 
 
5 Concluding  remarks  .......................................................................................  21 
 
References .............................................................................................................. 23 
 











The ongoing international economic crisis has been blamed, in part, on credit 
policies. It has been proposed that lending was too lenient during the pre-crisis 
period, thus contributing to a build-up of credit risk. When the crisis hit, credit 
policy tightening further choked the economy. Variants of these views have 
appeared in connection with numerous historical crisis episodes. They have 
inspired calls for tighter supervision of the financial system, public intervention to 
ease the credit crunch, and urgent monetary policy responses to bank behaviour.
1 
  In this paper we examine the hypothesis that banks’ credit policies are lenient 
during boom periods and tight during busts. We refer to this hypothesis as the pro-
cyclical credit policy hypothesis, or ‘the hypothesis’ in short. The hypothesis has 
been associated with Hyman Minsky (1986), who links lenient credit policy 
during booms with euphoria, and tight credit policy during busts with pessimism. 
Alternatively, Rajan (1994) links pro-cyclical credit standards with herding, 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) with capital constraints,
2 and Ruckes (2004) with 
cyclical changes in the average quality of credit demand. Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2006) propose that financial liberalization can undermine incentives for 
credit screening and contribute to a boom of bad credit. 
  Indirect econometric evidence is provided by Rajan (1994), who finds signs 
of a ‘cover up’ in banks’ loan/loss reporting during a real estate boom in New 
England (US). Jiménez and Saurina (2006) report that the allocation of corporate 
credit to riskier industries developed pro-cyclically and collateralisation counter-
cyclically in Spain (1984–2000). Chen and Wang (2008) identify a pro-cyclical 
contraction in the credit supply in Taiwan in the late 1990’s. 
  Like Chen and Wang (2008),
3 we use stochastic frontier analysis to test the 
presence of pro-cyclicality in credit policy. By reformulating the link between 
credit policy and the frontier model, we extend the applicability of the approach. 
We specify a novel test which is informative of many aspects of credit policy. 
  For the estimation, we use representative samples of household borrowers 
from a banking crisis cycle in Finland. The cycle has been ranked among the most 
extreme in a number of international studies.
4 One sample ten years after the crisis 
provides insight into a possible post-crisis easing of credit standards in line with 
                                                 
1 See, eg, various recent speeches by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke at 
www.federalreserve.com. For the earlier discussion, see Jimenez and Saurina (2006) and 
Kindleberger (2005) and references therein. Gerali et al (2008), and Goodfriend and McCallum 
(2007) discuss the implications for macroeconomics and monetary policy. 
2 See also Matsuyama (2007).  
3 See also Wang (2003) for a related contribution. 
4 The Finnish crisis is among the ‘five most catastrophic cases’ in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). It 
ranks fourth in terms of loss of GDP on Boyd, Kwak and Smith’s (2005) list, and is among the top 
10 in terms of restructuring costs on the IMF’s (1998) list.  
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the ‘institutional memory hypothesis’ of Berger and Udell (2004). They propose 
that credit policies are eased as banks’ memory of a crisis fades. 
  Our econometric results are consistent with significant changes in credit 
policies towards household borrowers during the cycle and its aftermath. We find 
that the focus of credit policy changed from collateral to current income during 
the cycle. We fail to find a credit crunch, ie, an overall tightening of credit policy 
during the economic and financial contraction. Credit limits tightened towards a 
minority and eased towards a majority of household borrowers around that time.  
  The evidence suggests that credit policy has eased in Finland since the crisis. 
Banks have become more lenient in granting credit limits. The ‘tailoring’ of limits 
has increased to account for both age and education-specific factors. At the same 
time, the idiosyncratic variance of limits has fallen: banks have become more 
consistent in their policy. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The methodology is 
explained in the following section. A demonstration of the method and the data 
follows in the context of a simple model which can be studied visually. We then 
move to present the main estimation results in connection with an extended 
econometric model. A summary of the results and our views on future work 




The pro-cyclical credit policy hypothesis is consistent with various theoretical 
approaches. The model developed by Minsky (1986) is non-standard with 
irrational expectations, the Berger and Udell (2004) approach is informal, while 
other scholars impose rational expectations with imperfect information. Rajan 
(1993) and Holmström and Tirole (1997) build on the agency cost theory, Ruckes 
(2004) on auction theory, and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) on the adverse 
selection theory of financial intermediation. 
  A notable insight from the literature is that cyclicality may appear in various 
forms. Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) 
propose that the collateral requirement is lenient during booms and tight during 
economic downturns. In Rajan (1994) and Ruckes (2004), there is random 
variation in whether credit is granted to borrowers with specific characteristics. 
Credit policy can be pro-cyclical in the sense that ‘bad clients’ have a higher 
probability of obtaining credit during boom periods than during busts. Rajan 
(1994) further discusses a third type of pro-cyclicality, related to the types of 
criteria imposed on loan availability.  
9 
  We aim to construct an empirical test that identifies the various types of 
cyclicality in credit policy. To this end, consider the following characterization of 
credit policy 
 




= ∏ =  (2.1) 
 
Equation (2.1) states that a ‘credit limit’, max(Li), granted to household i is 
determined by a vector of characteristics X and a vector of supply parameters β 
(Xi,j and βj refer to the j:th components of the respective vectors). Stochastic 
variation in credit supply is characterized by exp(v), where v is a standard normal 
random variable.  
  Equation (2.1) is not estimable, as only the realised credits and not the credit 
limits are observed. Realised credits are generated when borrowers use some 
proportion of their assigned limit. We denote by utilising exp(–ui) (from the unit 
line) the ‘used part of the limit’, such that:  
 
Li = exp(–ui)*max(Li) (2.2) 
 
Equation (2.2) decomposes realised credit into demand and supply driven 
components: the ‘used part of the limit’ reflects credit demand, and the limit 
reflects credit supply. As our focus is on credit supply, we do not attempt to 
model the determinants of demand explicitly in this paper. This interesting 
challenge is left for future work.  
  Rather, we make the assumption that the empirical distribution of the demand 
driven component exp(–ui) can be approximated by some well-behaved 
probability distribution. Formally, we assume that u is either a half-normal or 
exponential random variable. The distribution of u may be heteroscedastic and 
time-variant. 
  Under this distributional assumption, the non-estimable model (2.1) can be 
transformed into an estimable form. Multiplying both sides of (2.1) by exp(–ui), 
inserting (2.2), and taking logs gives the standard
5  stochastic frontier model 
 
i i i i u v ) X log( * ) L log( − + β =  (2.3) 
 
Credit supply parameters can, then, be estimated by stochastic frontier analysis 
from borrower data. Comparison of stochastic frontier models, estimated during 
different cyclical conditions, can reveal different types of cyclicality in credit 
policy. 
  To elaborate, theory predicts that borrower limits are larger during a boom 
than during a bust on average. Since the expected limit (in logs) is simply the 
                                                 
5 See Greene 2001 and references for a discussion of the method.  
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frontier (β*log(Xi)), pro-cyclicality may be tested by comparing estimated 
frontiers during different cyclical conditions. 
  The test is graphically illustrated in Chart 1 in a hypothetical case where X 
consists just of wealth and a constant. In the chart, expected limits are represented 
by two frontier lines, estimated from two hypothetical distributions of wealth and 
loans. Tight policy is represented by the lower and lenient policy by the upper 
frontier line. If the frontier lines intersect within the empirical distribution of 
borrowers, then one must conclude that the policies cannot be unambiguously 
ranked. In such cases, we report the percentage of households in each sample, for 
which one frontier is above the other. We can also characterize the households for 
which credit policy was pro-cyclical (in accordance with theory) to provide more 
intuition about the results. 
 
Chart 1.   Comparison of expected credit limits in graphical 










A1= frequent observations under both policies
A2=frequent observations under lenient policy
A3=only a few observations
 
 
      Note: A hypothetical example where the lower frontier line 
is estimated from an empirical distribution of loans (L) and 
gross wealth (W) during tight policy and the higher frontier 
line during lenient policy. The two frontier lines divide the 
plane of observations into areas A1, A2 and A3. 
 
 
Frontier analysis also reveals cyclicality in the variance of v, the consistency of 
setting limits, and in X, the credit criteria. 
  The test specification used here is, to our knowledge, novel. Wang (2003) and 
Chen and Wang (2008) use a variant of the frontier model to identify changes in 
credit supply and demand. They start from a similar characterization of credit 
policy as (2.1) and derive a test for credit supply shocks that is based on changes  
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in the estimated excess demand of credit. From our point of view the main 
limitation of their approach is that the test is only applicable if all borrowers are 
credit constrained.  By reformulating the link between credit policy (2.1) and the 
frontier model (2.3), we extend the applicability of the approach to realistic 
situations in which only some borrowers may be credit-constrained. We specify a 
novel test which is informative of many aspects of credit policy. 
 
 
3  Estimation results from a simple model 
We move to apply the method to real data under the simplifying assumption that 
X contains only gross wealth (and a constant). This ‘simple model’ can be studied 
visually. The analysis serves as a first look at the data and a demonstration of the 
method. 
  The surveys used in estimations are representative cross-sections of the 
Finnish household sector. From the surveys, four estimation samples can be 
constructed. The samples include households that increased borrowing during the 
‘estimation years’ 1988, 1995, 1999 and 2004. The number of observations varies 
from sample to sample between 1774 and 940. 
  Loans are measured at the end of each estimation year. We construct a proxy 
for gross wealth at the end of the estimation year from the market value of wealth 
at the end of the previous year, and the change in taxable wealth during the 
estimation year. An exception to this rule is the year 2004, in which case we use 
the market value of wealth at the end of the estimation year, as given in the 
survey. We discuss the implications of this methodological issue in more detail at 
a later stage. All variables are in natural logarithms, and deflated by the CPI 
index. Appendix provides details on the data and the calculations. 
  Economic developments around the estimation period are illustrated in Chart 
2. The liberalization of credit markets in Finland in 1986 was followed by a 
display of many of the classical symptoms of economic boom, such as high 
lending growth and booming stock and housing markets. The estimation year 
1988 marks the peak of lending growth. After the boom, the real economy dove 
into a deep recession, the stock and housing markets collapsed and a systemic 
banking crisis occurred.
6 In the estimation year 1995 the real economy was 
recovering, but the financial contraction still continued. 
  Analysis of the two latter samples provides information about changes in 
credit policy after the crisis. In 1999, both real and financial growth had returned 
                                                 
6 For a broader review of the events, see Nyberg and Vihriälä (1994), Koskenkylä and Vesala 
(1994), and Herrala (1999). The issue of a credit crunch is discussed explicitly by Honkapohja 
(2009), who argues that the prior evidence about the credit crunch in connection with the Nordic 
crises seems to be weak.  
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to positive territory. In 2004, loan growth had accelerated considerably. Fears of a 
looming banking crisis had, again, surfaced in the public debate. 
 
Chart 2.   Annual change in the household loan stock, 
      disposable income, house prices and stock prices, 
      1987–2007 (estimation years are marked with  




Note: All variables have been deflated by the CPI index. Data sources: CPI, the loan 




Chart 3 shows the scatter plots of loans and wealth along with frontier lines 
estimated in accordance with equation (2.3). During all the estimation years, the 
scatter plot starts out ‘thin’ on the left (towards low levels of wealth), and become 
broader to the right (towards high levels of wealth). It seems that in 1995 and 
1999 the distribution of loans was more tightly contained than in 1998 and 2004 
on the lower right. In the context of the model, this implies a change in the 
distribution of loan demand, specifically the demand for small loans among 
wealthy individuals. Such changes are captured in the model by the parameters of 
the distribution of u, which are allowed to vary with wealth and across time  
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periods. It is important to note that the scatter plots are consistent with the 
presence of a linear stochastic frontier for all the estimation years. 
 












































Note: Scatter plots of loans (L) and gross wealth (W) in the rating samples with estimated 
frontier lines. The variables are measured in 1000 euro, deflated by CPI to the 1999 level, 
and expressed in natural logarithms. Observations are marked by dots and the estimated 
stochastic frontier by a line. The frontiers are based on the simple model (see Table 1). 
 
 
The estimation results presented in Table 1 confirm the visual evidence. It can be 
observed from the table that wealth is a highly significant explanatory variable in 
the frontier. Its estimated coefficient has a correct sign in all the samples: the 
frontier is increasing in wealth as predicted by theory. That the coefficient of 
wealth is significantly below unity in all the cases implies a decreasing maximum 
loan to value ratio with respect to loan size. The hypothesis that both u and v are 
heteroscedastic with respect to wealth receives support from the statistical tests. In 
all the cases, the variance of v decreases with wealth, implying less consistency in 
setting of credit limits in connection with smaller than with larger loans. 
  The variance and mean of u are in all the samples increasing in wealth.
7 In the 
estimations, u is exponentially distributed, implying that the density of exp(–u), 
                                                 
7 The frontier lines were estimated under the assumption that u is exponentially distributed. Under 
this assumption, the estimation algorithm converged after only a small number of steps. The  
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var(u) is the variance of u. The fact that the variance is increasing in wealth 
suggests that more density appears at the frontier at lower levels of wealth than at 
higher levels of wealth. 
 
Table 1    Estimation results for the simple model 
 
  Year Endog. variable Exog. variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
1988 L W 0.33 0.03 12.92 0.00 0.28 0.38
c 2.73 0.11 24.23 0.00 2.51 2.95
var(v) W -0.16 0.06 -2.82 0.01 -0.27 -0.05
c -0.43 0.20 -2.11 0.04 -0.82 -0.03
var(u) W 0.10 0.05 2.13 0.03 0.01 0.19
c 0.13 0.21 0.62 0.54 -0.28 0.54
1995 L W 0.33 0.04 9.20 0.00 0.26 0.40
c 2.84 0.16 17.92 0.00 2.53 3.15
var(v) W -0.29 0.06 -4.69 0.00 -0.41 -0.17
c -0.31 0.24 -1.28 0.20 -0.79 0.17
var(u) W 0.10 0.05 1.79 0.07 -0.01 0.21
c 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.99 -0.50 0.50
1999 L W 0.42 0.03 12.60 0.00 0.36 0.49
c 2.44 0.16 14.83 0.00 2.12 2.76
var(v) W -0.24 0.04 -6.45 0.00 -0.31 -0.17
c 0.13 0.14 0.94 0.35 -0.14 0.39
var(u) W 0.19 0.05 3.77 0.00 0.09 0.29
c -0.52 0.27 -1.94 0.05 -1.05 0.01
2004 L W 0.53 0.04 15.13 0.00 0.47 0.60
c 2.34 0.17 13.82 0.00 2.01 2.67
var(v) W -0.28 0.05 -5.33 0.00 -0.38 -0.18
c -0.44 0.22 -1.95 0.05 -0.88 0.00
var(u) W 0.15 0.05 2.98 0.00 0.05 0.25
c 0.15 0.26 0.56 0.58 -0.36 0.66  
 
Note: The estimation results are from the simple model. Estimations were performed with 
the ‘frontier’ command with probability weights in Stata. In the frontier equation, loans 
(L) are regressed by gross wealth (W) and a constant (c). L and W are in natural 
logarithms, and deflated to 1000 euro of the year 1999 by the CPI Index. var(v) and 
var(u) refer to the natural logarithm of the variance of v and u respectively. u is assumed 
to be exponentially distributed, and v standard normally distributed. Since the frontier is 
linear in logs, (a small) number of observations which had zero wealth were omitted from 
each sample. The number of observations in each estimation sample was 1748, 1059, 
1057 and 936 households in 1988, 1995, 1999 and 2004 respectively. 
 
 
The estimated frontier lines are re-plotted in Chart 4 to promote an assessment of 
their relative positions during the crisis cycle and its aftermath. For clarity, Chart 
4A shows the estimated frontier lines for 1988, 1995 and 1999, and Chart 4B 
shows the frontier lines for 1999 and 2004. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
estimation algorithm does not converge under the alternative distributional assumption of half 
normality suggesting possible misspecification.  
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Note: Frontier lines estimated from the empirical distribution of loans (L) and gross 
wealth (W) in four samples by using the simple model. Variables measured in 1000 euro, 
deflated by CPI to the 1999 level, and expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
 
Chart 4A reveals that the fitted frontier line of 1988 was slightly below that of 
1995. The fitted frontier lines are very close to each other and the hypothesis that 
the two frontiers were equal cannot be rejected at the 5% level in a chi^2 test (the 
p value is 8%). These results are thus contrary to the hypothesis of pro-cyclicality 
of expected limits. Under this hypothesis, we should observe that the frontier line 
of 1995 was significantly below that of 1988. At the same time, the test gives 
mixed support for the institutional memory hypothesis. It appears that, as time 
since the crisis has passed, banks have tightened credit limits at low levels of 
wealth, but eased at high levels of wealth. 
  The variance of the credit limits was small in connection with small loans, 
and large in connection with large loans in 1988 in comparison with 1995 (Chart 
5). These differences are statistically significant. The estimation results of the 
simple model, then, suggest an increase in consistency in (a decrease in the 
variance of) credit policy related to smaller loans, and decreased consistency in 
connection with larger loans during the credit contraction. 
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Note: Estimated variance lines of v from the empirical distribution of loans (L) and 
wealth (W) in four samples. Loans and wealth measured in 1000 euro, deflated by CPI to 
the 1999 level, and expressed in natural logarithms. var(v) is the natural logarithm of the 
variance of v. 
 
 
4  Estimation results of an extended model 
We proceed to relax the limiting assumption that credit criteria include only 
wealth. Credit availability may also be significantly affected by current income 
and other characteristics that predict the longer-term repayment prospects of 
borrowers. 
  Accordingly, we estimate an ‘extended model’, in which X consists of two 
continuous variables, wealth and income (Y), and two sets of group indicators, 
age and education level (edu).
8 These group indicators most likely correlate with 
the life-cycle income profiles of the households and, thus, potentially affect credit 
                                                 
8 Age and education refer to the head of the family, as identified in the surveys. For the analysis, 
age is divided into three groups: age(1): age below 31 years; age(2): 31–50 years old; age(3): 51 
and over. Education is divided into six groups: edu(0): lowest level or no education; edu(3): mid-
level; edu(5): lowest level  higher education; edu(6): lowest university degree; edu(7): higher 
university degree; edu(8): highest university degree. Other groupings related to profession, 
socioeconomic status or sector of employment were considered but not included in the final 
analysis because the estimation algorithm failed to converge when more groups were added.  
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policy. We allow both group-specific fixed effects and variable effects in the 
frontier. 
  Chi^2 tests indicate (Table 2) that group effects are jointly statistically 
significant in all the samples. In 1988 and 1995, the parameters of the frontier 
varied across educational groups. In the two latter samples, for 1999 and 2004, 
significant variation in the parameters is observed with respect to both age and 
educational groups. It appears, then, that group characteristics affected credit 
policy more in the latter samples than in the earlier samples. 
 
Table 2.   Probability values for Chi^2 tests for group effects 
      in the frontier (H0: no group effects) 
 
  type group variable 1988 1995 1999 2004
fixed and variable effects age 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
edu 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
fixed effects age 19 % 12 % 8 % 2 %
edu 62 % 16 % 1 % 85 %
variable effects age W 62 % 19 % 75 % 2 %
edu W 0 % 20 % 0 % 3 %
age Y 39 % 30 % 13 % 3 %
edu Y 27 % 0 % 1 % 0 %  
 
Note: Fixed effects and variable effects of gross wealth (W) and income (Y) across age 
and educational (edu) groups in four samples. 
 
 
Table 3 gives the parameter estimates of the extended model. In the estimation, 
the comparison group comprises age group 3 (over 50) and educational group 3 
(lowest or no education). For this group, the estimated signs of the coefficients are 
as expected, and the levels make sense in broad terms. Interestingly, the 
significance tests for the coefficients (z-tests) suggest that the focus of credit 
policy changed from collateral to current income during the cycle. 
  Due to the high dimensionality of the model, graphical analysis of the 
estimated frontier is not practical. As an indication of the tightness of credit 
policy, we report in Table 4 for each sample year the proportion of households in 
that sample that would encounter tighter policy during the other estimation years. 
To perform the test, we used the extended model to calculate for each household 
in each of the estimation samples four frontiers and four idiosyncratic variances of 
the frontier, reflecting credit conditions during each estimation year. Table 4A 
reports a comparison of the frontiers and Table 4B a comparison of the 
idiosyncratic variances from the point of view of the borrowers in each sample. 
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Table 3.   Parameter estimates from the extended model 
     (*/**/***  =  5%/1%/0.1%  significance) 
 
  exogenous endogenous 1988 1995 1999 2004
L W .31*** .27* .42** 0.38
Y 0.15 .89*** 0.35 0.32
c 2.3*** 0.29 1.3 2*
age(1)*W 0.049 -0.097 0.051 0.13
age(1)*Y 0.21 -0.33 -0.51 -0.0099
age(1) -1 1.2* 1.6* -0.51
age(2)*W -0.0066 -0.068 0.013 -0.12
age(2)*Y -0.048 -0.19 -0.087 .52*
age(2) -0.56 0.34 -0.38 -1.7**
edu(3)*W -0.013 0.071 -.24* 0.044
edu(3)*Y 0.085 -0.068 .86* -0.083
edu(3) -0.085 -0.032 -1.9 0.12
edu(5)*W -0.032 0.1 -.23** 0.065
edu(5)*Y 0.28 -0.33 1.1** -0.031
edu(5) -0.5 0.73 -2.7** -0.29
edu(6)*W -.34*** 0.1 -0.052 -0.0063
edu(6)*Y 0.4 -.64* 0.64 -0.032
edu(6) 0.56 1.9* -1.9 0.25
edu(7)*W -0.12 -0.14 -.27*** 0.22
edu(7)*Y 0.16 0.54 0.32 -0.12
edu(7) 0.31 -1.3 0.26 -0.67
edu(8)*W -.54* -0.96 0.25 1.3**
edu(8)*Y 1.1 1.8*** 0.22 -2.1***
edu(8) -1.3 -2.8 -2.2 0.93
var(v) W -0.13 -0.2 -0.0052 -0.06
Y 0.22 -0.39 -0.65 -0.49
c -1.2 0.91 1.5 0.58
var(u) W 0.17 0.099 0.0035 0.073
Y -.68* -0.12 0.21 -0.15
c1 . 6 * * - 0 . 1 3 - 1 . 1 0 . 6 8
 
 
Note: Estimations were performed with the ‘frontier’ command with probability weights 
in Stata. In the frontier equation, loans (L) are regressed by gross wealth (W), income (Y) 
and a constant (c). Fixed affects and variable effects wrt W and Y are allowed in the 
frontier across age and educational (edu) groups. L, W and Y are measured in 1000 euro, 
deflated by CPI to the 1999 level, and expressed in natural logarithms. var(v) and var(u) 
refer to the natural logarithm of the variance of v and u respectively. u is assumed to be 
exponentially distributed, and the v standard normally distributed. Since the frontier is 
linear in logs, (a small) number of observations which had zero wealth was omitted from 
each sample. The number of observations in each estimation sample was 1748, 1059, 




Table 4.   The proportion of households in each sample for 
      whom policy would be tighter during the year of 
     comparison
9 
 
A Tightness in expected limit
y e a r  o f  s a m p l e :1 9 8 81 9 9 51 9 9 92 0 0 4
year of comparison:
1988 - 67 % 59 % 83 %
1995 36 % - 45 % 84 %
1999 44 % 56 % - 88 %
2004 17 % 20 % 22 % -
B Tightness in variance
y e a r  o f  s a m p l e :1 9 8 81 9 9 51 9 9 92 0 0 4
year of comparison:
1988 - 47 % 79 % 22 %
1995 54 % - 79 % 29 %
1999 10 % 16 % - 0 %
2004 70 % 81 % 97 % -  
 




To elaborate, the second column in Sub-table 4A shows that 36% of households in 
the 1988 sample would find a lower frontier in 1995 than in 1988. The last 
column of Sub-table 4B shows that a negligible proportion (0%) of households in 
the 2004 sample would find a lower variance of the frontier in 1999 than in 2004. 
In almost all the cases, assessments of policy tightness vary across households. 
Consequently, the estimation years cannot be unambiguously ranked in terms of 
policy tightness. 
  However, the year 2004 is lenient in terms of expected limits and tight in 
consistency of the limits from the point of view of most households. It is observed 
from the bottom row of Sub-table 4A that, in other samples, only 17–22% of 
households expected to find tighter limits in 2004 than during their own sample 
period. At the same time, 83–88% of households in 2004 expected to find tighter 
limits during other sample periods. In terms of the variance of the limit, the 
situation is qualitatively reversed. 
  The other observation years are more difficult to rank. Arguably the credit 
crunch year 1995 could be ranked as more lenient than the boom year 1988 in 
terms of expected limits, because a majority (67%) of the households in 1995 
                                                 
9 It may be interesting to note that the tables are not symmetrical in the sense that across-diagonal 
elements do not (usually) sum up to 100%. This feature reflects changes in the underlying 
samples, for example the characteristics of households in the sample of 1988 are not identical with 
the characteristics of households in the sample of 1995. It is unclear why the across-diagonal 
elements in Table 4A tend to sum to more than and in Table 4B to less than 100%.  
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would face a tighter limit in 1988 than in 1995. Only 36% of the households in the 
1988 sample would face tighter limits in 1995 than in 1988. 
  The results, then, point to the conclusion that, rather than a general tightening 
of policy in 1995 during the credit crunch, credit policy was tightened towards a 
minority of borrowers. By investigating the extended model further, we are able to 
provide insight into what types of household borrowers experienced a tightening 
in credit conditions during the crisis. 
  Consider the following decomposition of the frontier with respect to 
education and age effects 
 
. 2
i age , W i age , Y age
. 1
i edu , w i edu , Y edu i i ) W * Y * ( ) W * Y * ( )} L {max( E β + β + α + β + β + α =  
 
The extended model can be used to make this decomposition applicable to all 
households in all samples (except the group of comparison). The first part in 
parentheses is referred to as the ‘education-specific component’ and the second 
part as ‘the age-specific component’ of the limits. 
  We have studied the cyclical development of these components for many 
different types of households during the boom-bust cycle. An interesting pattern 
emerged from this study that is illustrated in Table 5 in connection with a 
hypothetical household that would be roughly at the middle of the income and 
wealth distribution during all estimation years. It can be observed from the table 
that the education-specific components of the credit limit tended to develop pro-
cyclically and the age-related components counter-cyclically. This regularity 
holds throughout a large part of the distribution of households. 
  Most likely, the pro-cyclical development of the education-specific 
components reflects the significant tightening of the government-subsidized 
student loan facility in the early 1990’s in Finland.
10 It is a merit to the approach 
used in this paper that it signals this supply shock at the credit market. 
 
                                                 
10 As a result of this move, the use of student loans fell markedly. To further investigate this issue, 
we used the extended model to calculate the tightness of expected limits during the years 1988 and 
1995 from the point of view of households belonging to socioeconomic group 6 (students). As 
many as 87% of student households in 1988 would face a tightening of expected credit limits in 
1995 compared with 1988. At the same time, only 14% of student households in 1995 would have 
encountered a tightening of the expected limits in 1988 compared with 1995.  
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Table 5.   Qualitative assessment of tightening (1) and  
      easing (0) of the group-specific components of 
      expected limits between 1988 and 1995 for 
      households with W=Y=3. 
 








edu8 1  
 
      Note: Borrowers characterized by gross wealth (W), income (Y), 
age and educational group (edu). Both variables measured in 
1000 euro, deflated by CPI to the 1999 level, and expressed in 
natural logarithms. The test is based on the extended model. 
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
We have studied banks’ credit policy during a pronounced cycle in Finland to test 
the pro-cyclical credit policy hypothesis. Our tests indicate that the focus of credit 
policy changed from collateral to current income during the cycle. Our evidence 
does not support the hypothesis of a general tightening of policy during the period 
of financial contraction. Rather, we find credit policy tightening towards a 
minority and easing towards a majority of household borrowers. An analysis of 
why we fail to find a general tightening of policy in line with the theoretical 
predictions is an important area for further study. 
  We find that credit policy in Finland had eased markedly by 2004, ten years 
after the banking crisis. Credit policy appears to have eased in the sense that the 
expected limits were raised, and the tailoring of limits increased to account for 
age- and education-specific factors of household borrowers. This result is 
consistent with abundant other information about the loosening of credit policy 
during the current decade which has resulted in the fall in pre-saving for a house 
purchase among young households in Finland.
11 
  One caveat is that any comparison of the results of 2004 with the other 
periods is complicated by the fact that wealth in 2004 was measured by using a 
different method than during the other years. We have studied the effect that this 
has on the estimation results, by comparing two  frontiers in 1988, estimated by 
using the two methods of measuring wealth. The year 1988 is the only sample in 
                                                 
11 This has been reported in a number of surveys by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services, 
www.fkl.fi.  
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which both measures are available. Based on this comparison, it seems likely that 
the method used in connection with the year 2004 gives a somewhat lower 
frontier at low levels of wealth than the other method. The level of the estimated 
frontier is about the same at higher levels of wealth, irrespective of the method of 
estimation. It appears, then, that the estimation results concerning the year 2004 
cannot be explained by the measurement issue. 
  Our analysis ought to be viewed in connection with the caveat that the results 
refer to a specific client group (households), and selected periods of a specific 
historical episode. Much more empirical study is needed to establish with any 
certainty whether, how, and how often pro-cyclical credit policy plays a role in 
the propagation of boom-bust cycles. We hope to have demonstrated one viable 
econometric approach with which such evidence can be gathered. 
  Our approach is based on stochastic frontier analysis, which is a well-
established method in efficiency analysis but relatively new in the study of credit 
constraints. We are able to extend the applicability of the approach and propose a 
test that is informative of many aspects of credit policy. Application of the method 
yields evidence of the presence of credit constraints in line with the prediction of 
the agency cost literature on credit. Confidence in the method is promoted by the 
fact that it successfully signals two well known loan supply events: the tightening 
of the government sponsored student loan facility and the easing of credit supply 
during the 2000’s. 
  We hope that our work and the work of Chen and Wang (2008) as well as 
Wang (2003), inspires further methodological debate in this field. The approach 
may offer a way to address the difficult issues of how credit constraints affect 
behaviour and, thus, macroeconomic development.  
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The data comprises complex surveys by Statistics Finland. The sampling clusters 
are households and the stratification is by income class. The imputations of 
missing variables and reweighting to account for missing observations have been 
carried out by the data provider.
12 
 
Table A1.  Construction of the data 
 
Estimation year  Construction of the data 
1988  The surveys for saving and indebtedness from 1987 and 1988 were merged 
to obtain a sample of 5248 households. The number of households that 
increased borrowing in 1988 is 1764. ‘pkor8’ from the 1988 survey was 
used as the probability weight. 
 
Loans (luoto8+vnyht8) and monetary income (kturaha88) are given in the 
survey of 1988. Wealth is estimated by adding to the value of wealth given 
in the survey of 1987 (bruttoy7) a proportionality factor times the change in 
taxable wealth in 1988 (vsvar8–vsvar7). The proportionality factor is 
estimated from the data by a linear regression of wealth on taxable wealth in 
1987.
13 
1995  The wealth survey of 1994 and the income distribution surveys for the years 
1994 and 1995 were merged to obtain a sample of 4951 households. The 
number of households that increased borrowing in 1995 was 1082. ‘pkor’ 
from the 1995 survey was used as the probability weight. 
 
Loans (aslaimk+muulaimk) and monetary income (kratulo-
kmakstu+tlue+tlue1+tlue2) are given in the income distribution survey of 
1995. Wealth is estimated by adding to the value of wealth given in the 
survey of 1994 (bruttoy) a proportionality factor times the change in taxable 
wealth in 1995 (svarat1995–svarat1994). The proportionality factor is 
estimated from the data by a linear regression of wealth on taxable wealth in 
1994, as in the earlier sample. 
1999  The wealth survey of 1998 and the income distribution surveys for the years 
1998 and 1999 were merged to obtain a sample of 3685 households. The 
number of households that increased borrowing in 1999 was 1072. ‘pkor’ 
from the 1999 survey was used as the probability weight. 
 
Loans (aslaimk+laiopin+laimuut) and monetary income (kturaha) are given 
in the income distribution survey of 1999. Wealth is estimated by adding to 
the value of wealth given in the survey of 1998 (bruttoy) a proportionality 
factor times the change in taxable wealth in 1999 (svarat1999-svarat1998). 
The proportionality factor is estimated from the data by a linear regression 
of wealth on taxable wealth in 1998, as in the earlier samples. 
2004  The wealth survey of 2004 of 3455 households was used in the estimation. 
The number of households that increased borrowing in 2004 was 940. 
‘koro04’ was used as the probability weight. 
 
Loans (asuvel+opivel+muuvel+yrilm), monetary income (kturaha) and 
wealth (bruttoy) are given in the survey.     
                                                 
12 Hyytinen, Määttänen and Johansson (2006) and Herrala and Kauko (2007) have previously used 
some of the surveys to study household finance. 
13 The proportionality factor is the coefficient of wealth in the regression ‘regress bruttoy7 vsvar7’ 
in Stata.  
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Table A2.  Analysis of population means of the continuous 
     variables 
 
  Year Variable Mean S.E. [95% Conf. Interval]
1988 L 2.59 0.05 2.50 2.68
W 3.36 0.06 3.24 3.49
Y 3.03 0.02 2.99 3.07
1995 L 2.69 0.05 2.58 2.79
W 3.04 0.08 2.88 3.21
Y 3.03 0.02 2.99 3.07
1999 L 2.71 0.06 2.59 2.82
W 3.06 0.10 2.86 3.26
Y 3.11 0.02 3.07 3.15
2004 L 2.82 0.07 2.68 2.97
W 3.51 0.10 3.32 3.70
Y 3.22 0.03 3.17 3.28  
 
      Note: Loans (L), gross wealth (W) and income (Y) in 1000 
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